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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

BERT T. :McKEE,
Plaintiff and Applicant,
vs.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, and
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON
PIPE COMPANY, a corporation,

CASE NO. 7258

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants disagree with the statement of facts set
forth in plaintiff's brief in the following particulars:
The 1937 injury which plaintiff suffered resulted
in disability from ''tenderness right inguinal regiontorn muscles, right side" (Tr. 124). For the 1944 injury
Dr. Taylor, ihe company doctor, was not consulted by
plaintiff for either treatment or diagnosis. Dr. Taylor
merely made a physical examination of plaintiff for
and on behalf of the company so that the company could
determine whether or not to hire plaintiff (Tr. 97, 168).
Plaintiff had consulted and relied upon doctors of his
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own choosing, a chiropractor and Dr. Orton, for diagnosis
and treatment (Tr. 97, 168) and had had diagnosis
and treatment prior to the time he saw Dr. Taylor. Dr.
Orton made a diagnosis of rheumatism and muscular
spasm prior to Dr. Taylor's di~gnosis, and treated
plaintiff therefor continuously until1946 (Tr. 71-76, 103).
Dr. Taylor's X-rays showed no bony deformity (Tr. 142).
They were taken after plaintiff had been to his own
doctors and after plaintiff was ready to return to work.
Dr. Taylor, not plaintiff's doctors, then informed McKee
that he should not work (Tr. 73). Dr. Taylor made a
diagnosis "back lists to right, muscles is spasm, movements limited. . . . In view of these findings a diagnosis
of lumbago was made" (Tr. 142). Dr. Orton did not rely
upon Dr. Taylor's diagnosis since Dr. Orton's diagnosis
was made first (Tr. 108). Dr. Taylor's X-rays were
made available to plaintiff through the Industrial Commission (Tr. 118). No request for the X-rays was made
by plaintiff until more than 3 years after the accident
(Tr. 118). Plaintiff was put on notice of his injury at
the time of the accident by reason of the fact that
''something snapped in his back which caused terrific
pain, which has never quit" (Tr. 48).
ARGUMENT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS TO
RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT, AND
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN.
Plaintiff, Bert McKee, argues that the statute of
limitations applicable to his claim does not begin to run
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3
until the disability became apparent to McKee, or, until
the compensable nature of an injury became apparent
to him; and if the statute of limitations is construed to
run from the time of the occurrence of the accident as
distinguished from the time of disability, or knowledge
of disability, that it is unconstitutional as a violation
of due process of law. McKee cites the case of Salt Lake
City vs. Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P. (2nd)
657. In that case it was held that Section 104-2-26, (which
provided for a one year statute of limitations on a
liability created by statute) was controlling. This case
also held that the statute begins to run ''not from the
time of the accident, but from the time of the employer's
failure to pay compensation for disability when the disability can be ascertained, and the duty to pay compensation arises." The case of Williams vs. Industrial Commission, 95 Utah 376, 81 P. (2nd) 649; cited by McKee,
applies the same statute. In the case of Hallstrom vs. ,
industrial Commission, 96 Utah 85, 83 P. (2nd) 730,
the Court applied this same one year statute, but referred
to and clarified the Salt Lake City decision (supra). The
court said:

...'

"The mere fact that an applicant does not
deduce from an apparent physical infirmity the
conclusion that it came from a former accident
occurring in industry does not prevent the statute
from running."
Applying the law of these cases to McKee's situation,
McKee would be barred by the statute because both the
evidence offered by McKee (Tr. 71-72) and the Findings
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of the Commission (Tr. 48) show that McKee, on the
21st day of February 1944, while carrying and stacking
5 foot pipes, felt something snap in his back which caused
terrific pain and which has never quit. He thus at that
time was aware of his physical infirmity, and the mere
fact that he did not deduce from his apparent physical
infirmity the conclusion that it came from an accident
occurring in industry, did not :prevent the statute from
running.
But an even stronger case is now presented because
in 1939, after the cases above cited were decided, a
special statute of limitations, 42-1-92, was enacted which
superseded the general one year statute, 104-2-26, and
provided, in part, as follows :
"If no claim for compensation is filed with
the Industrial Commission within three years
from the date of the accident, or the date of last
payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall be wholly barred.''
The effect of this amendment is, in plain words, that
the statute shall run from the time of the accident and
not from the time of the injury. The Legislature was
changing the rule which theretofore existed. The Commission found that an accident occurred on the. 21st day
of February, 1944, and that an application was filed on
May 28th, 1948. This is more than the three years provided for and McKee's claim is therefore barred. The
annotation at 108 A.L.R. 316, 317 lists a number of cases
''where the compensation acts required claims for com-
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pensation to be made within a certain period, 'after the
accident', in which it was held that the time for filing
claims began to run from the time the accident occurred
and not from the time when a compensable injury became
apparent." In construing a similar statute, the court in
Dane vs. Michigan United Traction Company, 200 Michigan 612, 166 N.W. 1017, said:
''The construction which the section should
receive is that the time commences to run fron1
the day the accident causes the injury. This construction is in keeping with the intent of the
legislature to create a statute of limitations, and
thereby fix a time when employers could feel certain that their liability in any :particular case
had ended.''
See also, Smith vs. Solvay Process Company, 100
Kan. 40, 163 P. 645: Ehrhart vs. Industrial Commission,
172 Cal. 621, 158 P. 193.
Thus the statute of limitations has run against
McKee's claims.
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
Plaintiff argues that if the statute of limitations is
construed as running from the date of the accident as
dis·tinguished from the date the compensability of the
accident became apparent, that it would be in violation
of the due process clause of the constitution as depriving
him of a fundamental right. Plaintiff's claim was created
by an Aet of the Legislature and, in creating a right
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or cause of action, the Legislature has power to place
limitations thereon. In fact, the Legislature has power
not only to limit, but also to take away, both statutory
and common law rights. In the recent case of Masich vs.
United States Sme:lting, Refining & Mining Company,
---- Utah ____ , 191 P. (2Iid) 612, 624, a question arose as
to the construction and ·constitutionality of statutes providing that Workmen's Compensation rights should be
exclusive and an injured employee should be deprived
of his common law action for negligence. The court held
that in the case of partial disability for silicosis the
Legislature had deprived the employee of his common
law right of action for negligence and had given no
substitute remedy under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The court held that there was no violation of the
Constitution. Mr. Justice Latimer said as follows:
''It has always been contended by employers
that the act offended the due process clause
because it abolished certain defenses such as contributory negligence, fellow servant, and assumption of risk, and by the employee because it
abolished the common law tight of action for negligence. The contention has been overruled because no one has a vested right in any rule of law.
A statutory right can be taken away and it may
vest the individual with a right as sacred and
important as one existing under common law principles. Many states must have held that both
statutory rights and common law rights can be
taken away, otherwise, there can be no question
that acts which abolish actions for seduction,
breach of promise, criminal conversation, and
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alienation of affections, would be unconstitutional.''
There thus is no -violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
DEFENDANT IS NOTESTOPPED FROM RELYING
UPON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
THE STATEMENT BY THE COMPANY
DOCTOR WAS CORRECT.
Plaintiff argues that defendant is estopped from
relying upon the statute of limitations because of mistake
and fraud. As a basis therefor, plaintiff introduced
statements by the company doctor, Dr. Taylor, that the
X-rays did not disclose any bony deformity of the back.
Inasmuch as the Commission rejected plaintiff's contention that defendant was estopped from relying upon the
statute of limitations, it is not now within the province
of this court to say that as a matter of law the Commission should have found the fact to be ·that Dr. Taylor
was wrong in his diagnosis. There was a question of
fact as to whether or not there was any misrepresentation, and there is sufficient evidence from which the
Commission could have found there was none. Defendant submits that the statement of Dr. Taylor, that the
X-ray did not show any deformity, was correct. Even
Dr. Richards, plaintiff's witness, in testifying that there
was a bony deformity apparent in the company's X-rays,
testified it was difficult for him to see such deformity
(Tr. 163). Plaintiff's evidence to rebut Dr. Taylor's
diagnosis of lumbago is Dr. Richards' testimony that
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"ordinarily" rheumatism over a "substantial" period
of time has an effect on the bone structure which would
show in an X-ray, and that there was no indication of
rheumatism on the X-rays (Tr. 165-166). The Commission was free to consider other evidence on the point,
such as the letter from Dr. Taylor to the Company (applicant's exhibit A, (Tr. 142) wherein it was stated
"X-rays were taken which show no bony deformity" and
the X-rays themselves, (applicant's exhibit D), and a
similar diagnosis by plaintiff's doctor, Dr. Orton, all of
which are evidence sufficient to support a finding that
there was no bony deformity. Plaintiff's own doctor
testified that he treated plaintiff for lumbago or muscular spasm (Tr. 103). The doctor said he relied upon
Dr. Taylor's diagnosis from X-rays, but Dr. Taylor had
not taken the X-rays at the time Dr. Orton treated plaintiff for lumbago (Tr. 71-76). The Commission expressly
found that there was an injury, but it made no finding
that there was. a bony deformity. In other words, the
conclusion made by the Commission that the plaintiff
was barred by the statute of limitations is supported
by evidence that there was no bony deformity, thus there
was no misrepresentation, mistaken or fraudulent, and
thus no estoppel.
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RELY UPON MISTAKE
TO TOLL THE STATUTE.

If it be assumed that Dr. Taylor's reading of the
X-ray was incorrect, and that there was a bony deformity, and if such diagnosis were a mistake, the statute
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of limitations is not tolled. The case of Maloney vs.
Brackett, 275 Mass. 479,176 N.E. 604, was a case in which
the plaintiff sued two physicians for malpractice, alleging fraudulent concealment as excuse for late filing, and
the trial court entered judgment on a directed verdict
for the defendants. In overruling the plaintiff's exceptions, it was held that the failure of a doctor to disclose
a cause of action to a patient could not be found to be
a breach of his professional duty without evidence that
he knew or believed that a cause of action existed; that
there was no evidence that either defendant knew or
believed that he had performed or assisted in the performance of an unnecessary operation, and that the
prediction as to plaintiff's recovery made before the
operation had no tendency to :prove that they did not
in good faith consider the operation advisable.
The annotation cited by plaintiff at 173 A.L.R. 576
is authority for tolling the statute of limitations in the
case of fraud only. The two· cases cited by plaintiff,
Pashley vs. Pacific Electric Company, 25 Cal. (2nd) 226,
153 P. (2nd) 325, and Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535,
17 P. (2nd) 244, were both cases of a fraudulent misrepresentation by a doctor who was treating the plaintiff.
The only other case cited by plaintiff purporting to deal
with mistake or fraud, is the case of Anderson vs. Contract Trucking Company, 48 N. M. 158, 146 P. (2nd) 873.
This case was not one of fraud or mistake. It was merely
dealing with the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run. It applied the New Mexico statute
and held that the statute provided that the :period of
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limitation should commence to run when the injury
became apparent as distinguished from when the accident
occurred. This case cites with approval those Utah cases
decided before the Utah Statute was amended to run
from the date of the accident as distinguished from the
date of the injury.
There is no ·evidence in the record to indicate that
Dr. Taylor's diagnosis, if wrong, was anything more
than a mistake, and mistake does not toll the statute of
limitations.
EVEN IF DR. TAYLOR KNOWINGLY WITHHELD
INFORMATION, THE STATUTE IS NOT TOLLED.
In the case of Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.
(2nd) 244, 250, the court said:
''In courts of equity it is settled doctrine that
a fraudulent concealment of a cause of action will
postpone the operation 'Of the statute of limitations until the discovery of the fraud, and by the
weight of authority the same rule prevails in
actions at law. 37 C.J. 972. As a general rult•,
it may be stated that, in the absence of a trust
or fiduciary relation between the parties, a failure or withholding of known facts or concealing
of them by the alleged responsible :party and of
which the other party is ignorant, and which go
to make up or give a right to a cause of action,
is not such a fraudulent concealment of the cause
of action as to prevent the running of the statute.''
McKee's case is distinguished from both the Peteler
case (supra) and from Pashley vs. Pacific Electric ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pany, (supra), the only cases cited by plaintiff dealing

with misrepresentations, by reason of the fact that Dr.
Taylor was not McKee's doctor. There was no fiduciary
relationship inasmuch as Dr. Taylor was merely acting
on behalf of the defendant company to examine and not
to treat McKee, (Tr. 97, 168). Dr. Taylor's sole purpose
was to find out on behalf of the company whether McKee
was physically able to work. Thus, under the Peteler
rule, even if Dr. Taylor knowingly and intentionally with.
held from him information as to McKee's true condition,
the statute would not be tolled inasmuch as there was no
fiduciary relationship.
MISREPRESENTATION AS TO EXTENT OF
INJURY DOES NOT TOLL THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.
So long as McKee knew there was something wrong
with his back, even if it be assumed that Dr. Taylor
fraudulently made a false diagnosis in order to prevent
McKee from filing a claim, he cannot rely upon estoppel.
One aware of an injury, who was misinformed by defendant as to the extent thereof, cannot rely on the
position that defendant is estopped from relying on the
statute of limitations, even where the statute begins to
run from the time the injury becomes apparent, as distinguished from the time of the accident. The court in
Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 Pac. (2nd) 244, 250,
said:
"It may also be stated that, where the alleged
tort or breach is complete and is not continuing,
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ignorance of the plaintiff as to the extent of the
consequential injury or damage until after the
statute of limitations had run does not postpone
the running of the statute."
Here the Commission in its findings of fact found
''while carrying and stacking five foot pipes, something
snap;ped in his back which caused terrific pain which
has never quit" (Tr. 48). Such a finding is binding upon
this court, 42-1-79, U.C.A. 1943. Defendant therefore
knew from the time of the accident to date, without consulting any doctor, that there was something wrong with
his back. If he did not conclude that his injury was of a
serious enough nature to warrant making a claim against
his employer until after the statute of limitations had
run, he is nevertheless barred. Pruett vs. Wichita Falls
& S. R. Company, ____ Texas ____ , 109 S.W. (2nd) 538.
Combining Dr. Taylor's diagnosis of lumbago and
the findings of the Commission, plaintiff was aware of
facts which would have enabled him to recover if he had
filed a claim within the limitation period. For, although
lumbago itself is not compensable, a "lighting up" or

(

aggravation of a pre-·existing condition or weakness is
compensable. Under the Commission's findings there

I

was such a "lighting up" when "something snapped in
his back which caused terrific pain". There \Yas thus no

I

re:presentation by the company doctor to the effect that
plaintiff had no claim against the company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
WITHHOLDING OF X-RAYS HAD NO EFFECT
UPON THE TOLLING OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Plaintiff complains that the X-rays were withheld
from him and that he was therefore prevented from filing
his claim in time. Plaintiff knew without having a doctor
look at X-rays that he suffered an injury while working
because of the "terrific pain". Furthermore, defendant
did not refuse to allow McKee access to the X-rays, hut
only declined to give them directly to McKee ( Tr. 118,
148). This was not done for the suppression of information but for the safekeeping of company property and
records, inasmuch as the defendant told plaintiff the
X-rays and any other information desired were available
upon request of the Commission (Tr. 118-119). Furthermore, plaintiff did not ask for the X-rays or work record
until the fall of 1947 (Tr. 118-119). The accident occurred
February 21, 1944 (Tr. 48). The three year statute of
limitations had run before any request was made to
see the X-rays. Defendant therefore submits that the
refusal to give :plaintiff the X-rays and work record had
no ·effect whatever upon plaintiff's timely filing of his
claim and therefore could have no effect upon estoppel
of defendant to rely upon the limitation period.
IF THERE WAS A MISREPRESENTATION, THERE
WAS NO RELIANCE THEREON BY PLAINTIFF.
Further evidence upholding the Commission's decision is that there was no reliance by plaintiff upon any
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statement made by Dr. Taylor. Without reliance there
can be no estoppel, 19 Am. Jur. (Estoppel) Par. 83.
Plaintiff (Tr. 168) and iplaintiff's wife (Tr. 97) both
testified that Dr. Taylor was consulted only to get a
clearance to go hack to work, after plaintiff's own doctors
had made their own diagnoses and given plaintiff their
own treatments (Tr. 103). Plaintiff was relying upon his
own doctors and not upon Dr. Taylor in deciding whether
or not to file a claim. Plaintiff did not go to Dr. Taylor
to find out what was wrong with him. He went to Dr.
Taylor presenting himself as able and ready to go back
to work after treatment by his own doctors. It is reasonable to assume that his own doctors had said he was
able to work. It was only when plaintiff went to the
company doctor that he was told that he was not well,
that his "back lists to right, muscles in spasm" and that
plaintiff should not work.

CONCLUSION
Defendant therefore submits that the statute of
limitations provides that a claim must be filed within
three years from the date of the accident. Plaintiff did
not so file. Defendant is not estopped from relying
upon the statute of limitations because there was no
misrepresentation by defendant or its doctor. And if
there was a conscious withholding of information, there
was no fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendant and defendant's doctor, so the statute was not
tolled. If there was a misrepresentation by defendant
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through its doctor, the statute is still not tolled because
of the following reasons :
1. It was due to mistake, not fraud.
2. It was a misrepresentation as to the extent
of the injury, rather than as to the existence of any injury.
3. There was no reliance upon the misrepresentation.
Res:pectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN,
Assistant Attorney General
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE,
Attorneys for Defendants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

